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1. Introduction 
Abundant natural resources play an important role in influencing national economics and 
international economic relations. The availability of mineral resources, first of all oil and 
gas, affects economic development in oil- and gas-exporting countries and serves as a source 
of accumulation of national wealth and economic growth. But at the same time, as history 
shows, economic prosperity doesn’t necessarily need availability of natural riches. For 
example, such progressive countries as Japan, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea or 
Singapore are resource poor but it doesn’t keep them away from being among the world’s 
richest economies. Among developed countries, for instance, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have nowadays a very small share of natural capital in the national wealth as 
well.  
However, few resource-rich developing countries managed to preserve reaped economic 
gains from the mineral resource discovery and to sustain acceptable economic growth. The 
exceptions are Botswana, Chile and Oman. To the contrary Sierra Leone, Bolivia, Nigeria 
and Zambia have experienced serious destructive influence of resource abundance and are 
among poorest countries in the world.  
So how should government spend oil revenues to sustain and stimulate economic growth, to 
support socio-economical development and to accumulate wealth? Which challenges do 
resource-rich countries experience? Is it possible to use natural resources without hurting 
national welfare? All these questions are important in investigation the influence of oil 
windfalls on national economies.  
Different indicators can be used to describe the country’s resource dependence, for example 
the share of oil exports in gross domestic product (GDP), the share of oil exports in total 
exports or the share of natural capital in total capital. It is useful to look at the relations 
between the share of natural capital in total capital, for instance, and the rate of annual GDP 
growth to find out the groups of countries that are resource poor but have decent economic 
growth and that are resource rich but have low economic growth. Numerous multiple 
regression analyses with different determinants of economic growth have been conducted to 
reveal the negative relations between government oil revenues and the rate of economic 
growth. 
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The key to understand the difference between high- and low-performing economies is to 
look at the spending of the oil windfalls. Oil price shocks happened often for the last forty 
years when oil started to play an important role in the economies of countries that found it. 
The reaction to these shocks defined their future making some countries prosperous and 
some even poorer than they had been before. So the question that arises naturally is how to 
handle oil revenues to make country “blessed” by oil abundance and what is the optimal way 
to spend oil income. Is it a right way to spend the entire windfall right now or to invest 
money in domestic or foreign assets? Some countries as Nigeria and Mexico used oil 
revenues heavily on current spending and carried large investments projects but it didn’t help 
them to reach long-term success. However there were certain reasons that pushed them to 
follow this strategy. In contrast Norway didn’t follow their way and chose its own behaviour 
of saving almost all oil revenues that helped to sustain the country’s economy during the 
crisis in the beginning of 1990s and to achieve social welfare. However the starting points 
for mentioned countries were quite different so it is countries’ specific features that define 
the development strategy such as oil reserves, oil production, political regime, the presence 
of rent seeking, trust of population to the government, the government aim to have fair 
distribution of oil revenues among the generations, i.e. the complex of economic, political 
and social reasons. 
Savings of oil revenues are done by establishment of oil funds in many countries. There are 
“stabilization funds” helping government to cope with the volatility and unpredictability of 
oil prices and hence oil revenues, and “saving funds” dealing with intertemporal perspective 
of saving oil revenues for the future. But oil funds have their own bundle of problems related 
to the integration of oil funds into the budget, complications of fiscal policy and the 
management of public assets and liabilities.  
The plan of the thesis is the following: first there is a theoretical chapter that contains an 
intertemporal optimization model of national wealth. It tells about what optimal 
consumption path of natural resources should be and how temporary and permanent shocks 
influence it. Besides there are examples of optimal spending rate under different shocks and 
an example of establishment of a hypothetical petroleum fund. The next chapter narrates 
about  four leading oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico and Norway) in historical 
perspective. The influence of oil on the economies of these countires is discussed. The 
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following chapter holds comparison of four oil exporters, namely their reaction to four main 
oil price shocks that happened in 1973-74, 1979-80, 1986 and 2003-2004.  
The data necessary to analyse the historical background and make comparison of oil 
exporters such as oil prices, total oil production, public finances and currant account deficits 
for 1970-2006 are available on-line through the web-page of The British Petroleum 
(http://www.bp.com ), OECD (http://www.oecd.org ), OPEC (http://www.opec.org), the 
World Bank statistics (http://www.worldbank.org ) and national statistics bureaus 
(www.sama.gov.sa, www.cenbank.org, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, 
www.ssb.no ).  
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2. An intertemporal optimization model of national 
wealth 
There are two fundamental methods of looking to the perspective of optimisation. The first 
one is individual perspective presented by the descriptive models of any economy where 
private consumers are optimising the use of their own resources. The second approach, 
which is considered here, is the social planner perspective presented by the normative 
models where the whole government’s act is optimised over time. In our case the 
government, or social planner, decides how oil revenues should be spent and distributed 
fairly between generations. 
In that way the purpose of this chapter is to figure out government’s behaviour in the 
stochastic settings that are inherent to consumption and investment decision-making and to 
analyze the influence of the temporary and permanent shocks in the form of oil price 
changes on the optimal consumption path. The stochastic settings are chosen because the 
assumption of perfect foresight is far from being realistic one: people can not foresee all 
temporary shocks that can happen to economy. “A stochastic current account model” from 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and “An intertemporal optimization model of national wealth” 
from Bjerkholt, Olsen Vislie (1990) are taken as the basis. 
Another assumption is rational expectations. Decisions today are based on the information 
that we have received lately but our expectations should be revised as we receive new 
information about future. Mathematically a rational expectation is a conditional expectation 
based on an accurate model of the economy’s structure and on all the information about 
current economic variables that the individual has available1. The advantages of using 
rational expectations are that rational forecasts are unbiased, i.e. on average correct, and that 
rational forecast errors are uncorrelated with the information on which the forecast was 
conditioned. Besides rational expectations help to avoid a warning that says that pure 
extrapolation of past into the future is dangerous (the Lucas critique). A macro model with 
backward-looking expectations can not be used to predict future behaviour if a policy regime 
has changed because this change will influence the formation of expectations as well. 
                                              
1 Obstfeld, Rogoff (1996) 
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The model presented here is designed for a small open economy with government whose 
horizon of planning is infinite. A “small” economy means that it always faces a fixed world 
interest rate and can’t unilaterally influence it. The assumption about infinite horizon is 
justified by two reasons. The first one is that the terminal date is uncertain. Good social 
planner is interested not only in its current wealth, consumption etc. but also in the 
prosperity of all future generations of the country that form the sequence of finite-lived 
individuals. So then it is justified the using of infinite horizon. The second reason is the 
following: saying that there is an infinite horizon in the model is the same as saying that the 
terminal date is quite distant2. So factually an infinite horizon is the same as a finite horizon 
but just very remote.   
The concept of national wealth is meant to represent future consumption possibilities. The 
national wealth consists of four elements: natural resources (petroleum), real capital, human 
capital and net foreign debt.  
The government taking into account uncertainty maximises the expected discounted value of 
utility function subject to the wealth constraint; the problem is to find the optimal 
consumption path. Hence the model represents an intertemporal choice between present 
consumption and formation of the national wealth. The management of the national wealth 
solves the question whether to consume income from petroleum production and production 
of other goods and services today or to make investments for future consumption.  
The formal model has the following form: 
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where sC  is total consumption; 
                                              
2 If T is the terminal date, then it could be stated that T → ∞. 
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)( sCU is the utility of consumption; 
δθ += 1
1 , δ is the subjective discount rate; 
Bs is foreign riskless bonds; 
sI is investment in real capital during period s; 
r is the real rate of return of foreign bonds; 
sY  is production of other goods than petroleum; 
Ps is price of petroleum; 
sx  is petroleum production. 
The exogenous variables are the subjective discount rateδ and henceθ , the rate of return of 
foreign bonds r and price of petroleum at the period t Pt. Investment sI as a first-time 
approximation is also given independently. Maximisation of the expected value of lifetime 
utility function is taken with respect to consumption sC . 
It is assumed that consumption decisions and investment decisions can be separated. So 
investments in the real capital are independent of oil prices and hence oil revenues. In the 
small open economy where world interest rate is exogenously given social planner buys 
capital in the world market until marginal productivity of capital is equal to that interest rate. 
In our case government will do it all the time irrespective of oil revenues.  
So the decision about whether to invest at home or to lend abroad should be independent of 
oil prices. Besides in practice government often doesn’t look at the return of investments: it 
has other rational reasons, for example political ones, when it considers where to invest.   
If δ < r, i.e. the subjective discount rate is smaller than the rate of return of foreign bonds, 
then the country will have a growing consumption path; if δ > r, i.e. the subjective discount 
rate is higher than the rate of return of foreign bonds, than country will have a decreasing 
consumption path. Only when it happens that δ = r, then country will have path with 
constant consumption that will be optimal, i.e. consumption will follow a trendless long-run 
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path. On the one hand, this is the knife-edge behaviour because at δ = r consumption will be 
constant. On the other hand, we are making this simplifying assumption just to focus on the 
effects of spending oil revenues but not to concentrate on consumption and income growth.  
The wealth constraint consists of riskless foreign bonds and petroleum wealth. Only riskless 
foreign bonds are considered because if other assets with risky payoffs were included in the 
analysis, it would influence model’s dynamics. Ps sx  represents the net oil revenues as the 
costs of oil production are disregarded.  
Using period by period the intertemporal budget constraint (2) helps to eliminate 
consumption levels from the maximised expected discounted utility function, turning the 
consumer’s problem into the unconstrained one with respect to the sequence of contingency 
plans for riskless foreign bonds3: 
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Then the first order condition with respect to sB  has the following form: 
{ } { })()1()( 1+′+=′ stst CUErCUE θ .    (3) 
If s = t then equation (3) turns to: 
{ })()1()( 1+′+=′ ttt CUErCU θ .    (4) 
Equation (4) is the intertemporal consumption Euler equation that shows that at a utility 
maximum the consumer can’t gain from feasible shifts of consumption between periods. 
The solution of the model helps to find the optimal consumption under uncertain income 
where the uncertainty of oil revenues can be represented by the probability distribution of oil 
prices.  
First we shall consider the utility functions with quadratic preferences and after with non-
quadratic preferences.   
                                              
3 Obstfeld, Rogoff (1996) 
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2.1 Quadratic form of utility function  
The utility function for consumption takes the following form of deviation from the target 
optimal value C which is a bliss point: 
( )2
2
1)( CCCU tt −−=  
( ) ttt CifCCCU 0)( ≥−−=′ ≤C . 
The closer consumption is to the target value, the more an individual is risk averse. In other 
words, he/she is less willing to undertake more risky project, the higher is the already 
attained level of consumption. This is the disadvantage of using utility functions with 
quadratic preference as it is empirically more reasonable to assume that the risk aversion 
decreases or is constant as higher consumption levels are reached4.  
The quadratic utility function allows finding optimal consumption path. To do this equation 
(3) should be combined with equation (2). The special assumption that subjective discount 
rate equals to the rate of return of foreign bonds δ = r gives the following 
result 1
1
1)1()1( =
+
+=+ δθ rr . Substituting marginal utility that is linear in consumption 
into equation (4) we have: 
{ }1+= ttt CEC .        (5) 
Hence it means that consumption follows a random walk. The intertemporal budget 
constraint (2) holds with probability one (no Ponzi game is allowed), thus the application of 
mathematical expectation doesn’t violate equation (2):  
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4 Bjerkholt, Olsen and Vislie (1990) 
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The Euler equation (3) implies in the case of quadratic utility function for s > t that 
tttststst CCECECECE ===== +−− 121 ... . Substituting it to the equation (6) and rearranging 
the terms we get: 
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Then the solution for the optimal consumption path has the following form: 
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Oil revenues influence the optimal consumption path in the following way: the higher oil 
prices are, the higher is the optimal consumption level. Higher production of other goods and 
higher investments in foreign riskless bonds influence also positively on the optimal 
consumption level. The effect of investment in the real capital can be both positive and 
negative because investment decreases directly the optimal consumption level but at the 
same time it has indirect positive effect: investment affects production of other goods 
positively which in its turn has positive influence on consumption.  
2.1.1 Temporary oil price shock 
Using static expectations we can introduce temporary price shock which impact depends on 
the time profile of the petroleum production. As examples of the temporary shock it can be 
mentioned revolution in Iran or problems with the oil pipelines built on the territory of 
countries that are not oil-exporters. 
Here it is assumed that today’s oil price doesn’t influence expectations about the oil price 
tomorrow, i.e. that oil prices are independently distributed. Hence the oil price in period s,    
s > t, is given by: 
2)var(,)(; ssstss PPEP τπεπ ==+= , 
whereπ is expected oil price which is constant; 
sε is a serially uncorrelated disturbance, tε is known at t,
2
ss)( var  t; s0 τεε =>=stE . 
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Here the shock is temporary and that is why it doesn’t influence the following oil price 
formation and expected oil price.  
Rewriting equation (8) and assuming that sx is non-stochastic we get: 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
+⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
+= ∑∑ ∞
=
−
∞
=
−
))((
1
1
1
)(
1
1
1 ssts
t
ts
ts
ss
ts
ttt xErr
rIY
r
E
r
rrBC επ  
We can simplify the previous expression by defining  ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
= ∑∞
=
−
ts
ss
ts
tt IYr
E
r
rY )(
1
1
1
 
and  ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
= ∑∞
=
−
s
ts
ts
t xrr
rx
1
1
1
. So we get: 
)9(
1 tttttt
x
r
rxYrBC επ
+
+++=  
The variance of the oil price 2sτ  is not a parameter in the optimal solution so it doesn’t 
influence the optimal consumption.  
Equation (9) shows that the higher is the expected oil price, the higher is the optimal 
consumption level. In the case of uncertainty and assumption about certainty equivalence5 as 
here the social planner spends 
r
r
+1
 from this year’s additional income. So the temporary oil 
price shock will influence the present level of oil revenues and hence the present level of 
consumption. Besides it will also change the future levels of consumption. Namely, since the 
social planner increase savings through tB  future consumption will increase. 
Moreover we see the importance of production profile sx . It is different for various countries 
and it will affect consumption today. The higher is expected average of oil production, the 
higher will be optimal path of consumption. 
                                              
5 The social planner makes decision under uncertainty as if expected values were certain to be realized. 
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2.1.2 Permanent oil price shock 
Suppose that we have a permanent oil price shock and oil prices follow random walk: 
11 ++ += sss PP ε    (10) 
where 1+sε is a serially uncorrelated disturbance, 01 =+stE ε   s ≥  t.  
So here we have permanent oil price shock which can be represented by for example larger 
Chinese consumption of the oil. So the price shock in period s influence the whole sequence 
of prices, namely if this is a positive price shock, then the following oil prices will increase 
proportionally.  
Calculating expectations from equation (10) we get that ,...2,1, ++== tttsforPPE tst . So 
the oil price today is the best predictor for oil price tomorrow. 
Hence equation (8) becomes as following one: 
tttttttttt xPYrBxPYrBC )( 1 ε+++=++= −            (11) 
So the higher is the oil price shock, the higher is the optimal consumption level. Here the oil 
price shock influences not just the current level of consumption but also the future ones. If 
we have positive shock in period t, it will penetrate proportionally into period s increasing 
present and future consumption levels. For example, for period s+2 we 
have 21212 +++++ ++=+= ssssss PPP εεε , i.e. the shock in period s+1 is additively added to the 
shock is period s+2. Taking expectations we get: 112 +++ +== sssst PPPE ε . So equation (11) 
transforms to 212222222 )()( +++++++++ +++=++= ssssssstsss xPYrBxPEYrBC ε .  The social planner 
consumes 21 ++ ss xε of the additional income in the year s+2. Hence the shock in previous 
periods influences the consumption level in the next period and previous savings define the 
following level of consumption.   
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If oil prices have a multiplicative shock and follow random walk with the trend equal to the 
rate of return of foreign bonds6, then the oil price in period s is defined as: 
11 )1( ++ ⋅+= sss rPP ε    s ≥  t   (12) 
It is assumed that 211 )var(;1)( σεε == ++ sstE .  Hence .)1(
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So the oil price shock acts multiplicatively through the rate of foreign bonds. In comparison 
with the previous case where we had additive permanent shock, here the influence of the 
shock on the future levels of consumption will be multiplicative and propagates with the rate 
of return of foreign bonds. For example if we have an expected future shock in period 
s+1 11 )1( ++ ⋅+= sss rPP ε , then taking into account that 
1
2
1212 )1()1())1(( +++++ +=+=⋅+= ssssstst rPrPrPEPE εε  the consumption level in period s+2 
will be: .))1(())1((
1 1221
2
222 sssssssssss XrPrYrBXrPr
rYrBC +++++++ +++=++
++= εε  
Hence in period s+2 the social planner consumes additional income from the shock equal 
to sss XrrP 1)1( ++ ε and has accumulated savings 2+sB . So consumption in later periods 
depends on previous savings (for example tB ), which are influenced by the shocks. 
                                              
6 Hotelling’s theory of the market for exhaustible resources which says that the resource rent increases by the rate of interest 
r makes this case interesting. 
7 Comparing tX with tx , the first one is just the accumulated oil reserves and the second one is the discounted accumulated 
oil reserves. 
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Let’s consider the general case which earlier cases are special cases of: 
11 )( ++ +−=− sss PP επρπ  ,    (14) 
where π  is long-run equilibrium price; 
0=stE ε for  t s > ; 
10 ≤≤ ρ , what means that deviation of oil price in period s+1 decreases in comparison with 
deviation of oil price in period s. 
Here we have two types of shocks – both temporary and permanent, and the degree of 
permanence of shock is determined by ρ . 
This hypothesis imply that  
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Hence equation (8) can be rewritten in the following way: 
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Substituting π−tP  in (16) we have: 
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Hence if the shock is positive and temporary ( ρ < 1) and if the social planner pursues 
consumption-smoothing behaviour through asset accumulation, the optimal consumption 
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path will rise but not fully in the response of the shock because ρ
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Hence the social planner increases the present consumption level if the shock is positive. As 
in the case of the permanent multiplicative shock the oil price shock today influences the 
future consumption level as well, and the larger is ρ , the degree of permanence of the 
shock, the more long-lasting is the shock and higher is the future level of consumption. 
2.2 Optimal spending rate8 
Let’s try to find the optimal spending rate for three cases and compare them. Optimal 
spending rate is defined as ratio of consumption of oil revenues to current oil revenues, in 
other words it shows how much extra oil revenue is spent (consumed) due to the change of 
oil price. Let’s start with the case for permanent multiplicative oil price shock (see equation 
(13)). Then the optimal spending rate looks like:  
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11                   (19)     
where r is international real interest rate;  
sx  in numerator is expected oil production in year s; 
tx  in denominator is oil production in year t (today).  
Hence the numerator represents permanent income that corresponds to the possibility of oil 
revenues and the denominator represents the current income from oil production. In other 
words the optimal spending rate shows the ratio between expected effect of oil price on 
future oil revenues and current oil revenues.  
                                              
8 By “spending” it is meant just “consumption” here not including investment. 
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Using the statistics from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007 (see Table 1, 
Table 2 in Appendix), the following pattern of oil proved reserves and oil production are 
depicted on Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 for Norway, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria.  
The international real interest rate r is calculated as an average of interest rates for 30-year 
U.S. Treasury Bonds, issued from 1980 to 20069, minus average inflation rate for U.S. from 
1980 to 200610, and is equal to 3,96 percent. To calculate the average optimal spending rate 
the value of the oil proved reserves represented by accumulating flow is taken for 200611 and 
then discounted according to the formula (19), and production is taken as average for the 
whole period 1980-2006. 
Then the following results were achieved for optimal consumption rate (see Figure 2.3). We 
see that Saudi Arabia has the largest optimal spending rate equal to 3,36. On the second 
place is Nigeria with the optimal spending rate equal to 1,97. On the third place is Mexico 
with the optimal spending rate equal to 0,43 and then the forth place is taken by Norway 
with the optimal spending rate equal to 0,42. 
Fig. 2.1. Oil proved reserves, 1980-2006 
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9 Data for interest rates for 30-year U.S. Treasury Bills is taken from www.treasurydirect.gov.   
10 Data for U.S. inflation is taken from www.worldbank.org.   
11 The oil proved reserves are used instead of total expected reserves due to the availabillity of data. 
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Fig. 2.2. Oil production, 1980-2006 
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The difference in the optimal spending rates between Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico and 
Norway can be explained by the fact that Norway and Mexico have smaller current reserves 
which go to numerator in the formula for the spending rate in comparison with Nigeria and 
Saudi Arabia (see Figure 2.1). Oil production for Mexico, Norway and Nigeria fluctuates 
almost in the same region from 500 up to 4000 thousand barrels daily. Saudi Arabia has 
much larger level of oil production especially in the second half of 1990s which corresponds 
to higher level of oil proved reserves. So if we put these values into the formula, we will see 
that the optimal spending rate is high for Saudi Arabia and lower for Nigeria, Mexico and 
Norway. 
All spending rates are high (see Figure 2.3) because future oil prices are assumed to be 
developed according to Hotelling hypothesis which gives relatively large increase in them 
(see equation (12)). So if oil price shock tε ( tε 1  > ) is permanent and oil prices grow with 
interest rate (Hotelling hypothesis), then the impact of the shock is t
tsr ε−+ )1( and 
government can consume much more after shock, what Figure 2.3 exactly confirms. 
Time series of optimal spending rates for 1980-2006 were also calculated using the formula 
(19). As we see on Fig. 2.4, the optimal spending rate for Saudi Arabia in 1980 is quite low 
in comparison with 2006 – 1,7 vs. 2,5 due to discovery on enormous oil reserves. The same 
happened to Nigeria – 0,8 in 1980 vs. 1,5 in 2006. Mexican and Norwegian optimal 
spending rate decreased due to declined oil reserves. In 1980 they were equal to 2,3 and 0,7 
correspondingly and in 2006 to 0,4 and 0,3. Under the fall in prices in 1986 the optimal 
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spending rate declined sharply for Saudi Arabia, negligibly for Nigeria, stayed the same for 
Norway and increased for Mexico. Under the recent oil price increase in 2003-04 the optimal 
spending rates decreased for all countries except Norway where it didn’t change. Hence the 
change in the optimal spending rate reflects the change of countries’ policy and changes in 
output.  
Figure 2.3. Average spending rates for the case of permanent multiplicative shock, 1980-
2006 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Time series of spending rates for the case of permanent multiplicative shock, 
1980-2006 
 
 
Let’s find the optimal spending rates for other two cases – for temporary and permanent 
additive oil price shock (see equation (9) and (11)). In the first case it will be equal to:  
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And in the second case it will be equal to12:                                                                                                          
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Using the formulas (20) and (21) let’s compare the spending rates under different oil price 
shocks (see Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6). For simplicity I use a particular year (here I chose 1983) 
to make comparison possible. In the case with a permanent additive shock there is an 
assumption of every year’s constant future time path of production. Under the permanent 
multiplicative oil price shock the spending rates are the highest one as this is extreme case, 
under the permanent additive oil price shock the spending rates are considerably lower, and 
finally under the temporary oil price shock the spending rates are the lowest ones and always 
constant. These findings correlate with the findings about the levels of consumption under 
different assumptions about oil price shocks. Difference between the two cases with 
permanent shocks has to do with the assumption of trend growth in the oil price, i.e. 
Hotelling hypothesis. If we didn’t have this price trend, the impact of the additive and 
multiplicative shocks would be about the same. Hence if shock is permanent and Hotelling 
hypothesis is applied, then the social planner can spend much more than if it would be no 
assumption about Hotelling hypothesis and shock would be still permanent (see Figure 2.5). 
Figure 2.5. Optimal spending rates for the case of permanent additive and multiplicative 
shocks in 1983 
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Figure 2.6. Optimal spending rate for the case of temporary shock, 1980-2006 
  
2.3 Non-quadratic preferences and precautionary savings 
Concerning the case of uncertainty, precautionary savings should be mentioned. In the model 
above taking into consideration assumptions of quadratic utility function the social planner 
makes decision under uncertainty as if expected values were certain to be realized (certainty 
equivalence principle). And precautionary behaviour consists in the following: if the oil 
prices are high, you shouldn’t raise consumption to a high level as there is possibility of low 
prices in the future. Instead you have to accumulate a buffer of assets to run down in case of 
negative income shocks13.  Precautionary savings are especially relevant in the case of 
permanent shocks. Then they help significantly to smooth consumption between periods. 
To understand the mechanism of precautionary savings we need to have in mind equation 
(4)14 and to look at expected marginal utility which is determined by the third derivative of 
the utility function, )(CU ′′′ . If  0)( =′′′ CU  as in the case of quadratic utility function, 
uncertainty doesn’t influence expected marginal utility function. Hence an increase in 
uncertainty, i.e. an increase in the variance of the consumption, doesn’t affect expected 
marginal utility and social planner doesn’t follow precautionary behaviour. If )(CU ′′′ >0 as in 
the case of exponential utility function or isoelastic utility function, it means that marginal 
                                              
13 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
14 See equation (4):
 
{ })()1()( 1+′+=′ ttt CUErCU θ .  
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utility function is a convex function of consumption. Hence an increase in uncertainty of 
future consumption raises the expected marginal utility of consumption15. To hold equation 
(4) the right-hand side of which has risen, the left-hand side, namely )( tCU ′ , has to increase 
too. This happens if tC  falls (as )( tCU ′′ < 0) and hence savings increase, in other words the 
social planner is following the precautionary behaviour.   
 In the first case of oil price shock (temporary shock which doesn’t influence the following 
oil price formation) and in the second and third cases (permanent shock which follows 
random walk and random walk with the trend) uncertainty doesn’t matter if we have 
quadratic utility function: social planner behaves according to certainty equivalence principle 
and doesn’t do precautionary savings: if the oil price is high, he/she will increase 
consumption and decrease savings. 
But in the last case (two types of shock simultaneously) uncertainty matters for exponential 
function and the social planner will follow precautionary behaviour. The temporary and 
permanent shock will influence differently the strategy of the social planner. If you make 
mistake thinking that temporary rise in oil prices is permanent, then you will get utility loss. 
The most conservative approach is to consider a positive shock as temporary and a negative 
shock as permanent. Hence government which is following this strategy will save a lot but 
unfortunately will have uneven consumption. 
2.4 Example of consumption-smoothing behaviour 
Saving fund can represent an example of consumption-smoothing behaviour. The scheme for 
establishing and financing a hypothetical saving fund is represented in Table 2.1.  
Suppose in this hypothetical economy a real rate of return is four percent. Then the 
discounted value of oil revenue is equal to 947,961 today (see Table 2.1). If government 
decides to invest this money, it will earn 37,918 at the rate of four percent every year. Using 
just this amount it will keep oil wealth untouched and will allow to smooth consumption 
between present and future. 
                                              
15 Blanchard and Fischer (1989) 
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The aim is to establish a fund which wealth would be equal to 947,961. Using oil resources 
appropriately this allows to make a country richer and to smooth consumption between 
generations. Otherwise consumption would be small in the first years, later it will reach its 
peak at the tenth year and afterwards starts to decrease creating inequity in the distribution of 
natural wealth. 
The oil revenue in the first year is equal to 10 but the necessary amount is 37,918, so the rest 
is being borrowed.  The established fund begins its work with 0 and has to borrow -27,918. 
At the second year the oil revenue has increased to 20 but still the fund has the accumulated 
debt equal to 46,954. The debt accumulating stops at the sixth year when oil revenues are 
large enough to exceed the amount needed every year of 37,918. The fund is built up until 
the twentieth year when oil extraction is stopped and the fund wealth is exactly equal to the 
present value of oil revenues 947,961. So now if the rate of return is sustained at the same or 
higher level, it can last forever. So here it was made an example of how non-renewable 
resources have been transformed into renewable by the device of an investment fund16.  
Table 2.1. A hypothetical petroleum fund 
Year Oil Revenue 
Present 
value of 
the oil 
revenue 
Deposit to 
fund 
Fund balance 
(beginning of 
the year) 
Fund yield 
Fund balance 
(end of the 
year) 
1 10 9,615 -27,918 0,000 0,000 -27,918 
2 20 18,491 -17,918 -27,918 -1,117 -46,954 
3 30 26,670 -7,918 -46,954 -1,878 -56,750 
4 40 34,192 2,082 -56,750 -2,270 -56,939 
5 70 57,535 32,082 -56,939 -2,278 -27,135 
6 70 55,322 32,082 -27,135 -1,085 3,862 
7 100 75,992 62,082 3,862 0,154 66,098 
8 100 73,069 62,082 66,098 2,644 130,823 
9 120 84,310 82,082 130,823 5,233 218,137 
10 150 101,335 112,082 218,137 8,725 338,945 
11 130 84,446 92,082 338,945 13,558 444,584 
12 110 68,706 72,082 444,584 17,783 534,449 
13 90 54,052 52,082 534,449 21,378 607,908 
14 80 46,198 42,082 607,908 24,316 674,306 
15 50 27,763 12,082 674,306 26,972 713,360 
16 60 32,034 22,082 713,360 28,534 763,976 
17 70 35,936 32,082 763,976 30,559 826,617 
18 60 29,618 22,082 826,617 33,065 881,763 
                                              
16 Hannesson (1998) 
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19 40 18,986 2,082 881,763 35,271 919,115 
20 30 13,692 -7,918 919,115 36,765 947,961 
21 0 0,000 -37,918 947,961 37,918 947,961 
22 0 0,000 -37,918 947,961 37,918 947,961 
23 0 0,000 -37,918 947,961 37,918 947,961 
24 0 0,000 -37,918 947,961 37,918 947,961 
25 0 0,000 -37,918 947,961 37,918 947,961 
Present value of 
oil revenues (W) 947,961     
Annual yield of 
W at 4 percent 37,918     
 
Figure 2.7. Present value of oil revenues and fund balance at the end of the year 
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2.5 Other models 
There are numerous other models examining the problem of intertemporal consumption and 
saving levels that are distinguished between themselves by different assumptions and 
approaches. For example, it can be presumed that oil wealth is not invested in real or 
financial assets as in the previous model but just kept “under the ground” out of reach by 
politicians.  
Other variations are concerned about solving the Solow model for the closed economy 
emphasising the capital and labour endogenizing. Hannesson (1998) finds the optimum 
capital stock under the golden rule and the modified golden rule. He maximizes the 
discounted sum of utilities from now to eternity with respect to the growth rate of the capital 
stock. The labour force is ignored and assumed to be constant. There is also no technical 
progress to focus on the issue of use of petroleum wealth17. The discovery of the oil wealth 
                                              
17 Hannesson (1998) 
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helps to increase the current consumption and to accumulate capital in order to raise future 
consumption. The quantity that should be used for the latter purpose is defined by the initial 
capital level relative to the steady state. If the capital level is too high, then there was 
overinvestment in the past and it can be afforded to consume more now. In the opposite case, 
the current consumption should be limited in order to increase investments for future 
generations. When steady state is achieved all the oil wealth can be spent on consumption as 
in this case consumption is constant for the present and next generations.    
Bjerkholt, Olsen and Strøm (1990) take up a model where oil prices and costs are determined 
outside. The model’s objective function is again the discounted sum of utility of 
consumption. The national wealth consists of four elements: natural resources (petroleum), 
real capital, human capital and net foreign debt. There are two sectors in economy: the first 
one deals with petroleum that can be bought and sold at the market prices which are assumed 
to be constant in the model, and the second deals with all other goods. Production of the 
petroleum resources depends on the size of its reserves and on the profits from the real 
capital. All petroleum is assumed to be exported. Production of other goods depends on the 
real and human capital. Other assumptions are constant population and no technical progress.  
The achieved result is that optimal and constant change in consumption in the long run is 
equal to the product of real interest rate in the world market and oil wealth. Net marginal 
productivity for real and human capital are equal in the long run and are besides equal to the 
marginal interest rate at the international financial market.    
Another type of model is given by Bjerkholt and Offerdal (1985) where production and 
investment are exogenous and no labour is involved in the oil production; the objective 
function represents the discounted value of instantaneous per capita consumption weighted 
by the number of consumers, given the terminal conditions on net foreign assets and 
domestic non-oil capital18. According to the result they got the rate of optimal consumption 
growth is highly dependent on some of the exogenous assumptions such as the rate of time 
preference, the negative of the income flexibility and the own rate of interest of foreign 
assets.  
                                              
18 Bjerkholt, Offerdal (1985) 
 24
3. Historical description of leading world oil 
exporters 
This chapter gives description of historical perspective of four out of 10 top oil net exporters 
according to the rating made up by Energy Information Administration (the U.S. 
Government) (see Table 3.1). The chosen countries are Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico, and 
Norway. Making the choice I tried to look at the countries belonging to different 
geographical regions (Middle East, Africa, North America, and Europe), characterised by 
completely different historical, cultural, social and economic backgrounds. But there is one 
factor that unites all these different countries – it is oil abundance. Hence analyzing the 
usage of oil windfall we will see that it is internal factors that explain the effective or 
ineffective application of oil money in economy, successful or unsuccessful economic 
development and rapid or slow economic growth. There are no universal rules how to 
behave to have economy blessed and not cursed by oil because every country has its unique 
set of historic traits but there are some lessons that can be learned.  
Another criterion for choosing countries is availability of the data which is difficult to obtain 
for Middle East and African countries19. Here I used a lot the databases of World Bank, 
OPEC and statistics from the Central Banks and National Bureaus of Statistics 
(www.sama.gov.sa, www.cenbank.org, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, 
www.ssb.no ). 
Table 3.1. Top World Oil Net Exporters 
Top World Oil Net Exporters, 2006 
(thousand barrels per day) 
Rank Country Exports 
1 Saudi Arabia 8,525 
2 Russia 6,816 
3 United Arab Emirates 2,564 
4 Norway 2,551 
5 Iran 2,462 
6 Kuwait 2,342 
7 Venezuela 2,183 
8 Nigeria 2,131 
                                              
19 For Nigeria the majority of historical time series ends in 1987.   
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9 Algeria 1,842 
10 Mexico 1,710 
Source: www.eia.doe.gov  
3.1 Saudi Arabia 
The main source which was used to describe Saudi Arabia is Auty (2004) and data are taken 
from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (www.sama.gov.ng).    
Saudi Arabia is an example of the country with enormous oil reserves equal to 264 251 
million barrels in 200620 which experienced accelerated growth in 1970s, growth collapse in 
1980s and disappointing economic performance in 1990s with private investment falling in 
real terms each year since 1981/8221. It is worth mentioning that population of that country 
consisted just of 25 million of people in 2007. That gives us one special characteristic – 
namely, quite small ratio of population to country’s oil reserves.   
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia found its oil reserves in 1938. Those times the country was 
quite poor but oil booms in 1970s pushed government to develop a new strategy of overall 
spending embodied in a series of five-year plans. 
As we see on Figure 3.1, oil production increased rapidly and doubled from 1970 to 1980. 
That in combination with oil price booms let oil revenues increase from 35% of GDP to 60% 
of GDP (see Table 3.2). Saudi Arabia didn’t chose the rentier strategy which was followed 
by Kuwait as accumulating assets abroad and living on the rent stream would imply constant 
reliance on imports for goods and services. So in 1974 the government attempted to extract 
oil at a moderate pace (see Fig. 3.1) in order to have a sustainable growth, to ensure a steady, 
lasting income and to meet social goals. That is why during the first oil shock in 1973-74 
government oil revenues didn’t increase (see Table 3.2). However the country experienced 
surplus of 40% of GDP due to the huge oil revenues.  
Increasing international demand and price forced the Saudis to formulate a new strategy22 
that ended up in the Second Development Plan (1975-80). The new priorities were made and 
they concluded in sustaining a high rate of economic growth, decreasing dependency on oil 
                                              
20 www.opec.org  
21 Looney (1992) 
22 Hilarie (2004) 
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which rent made up over 60% of GDP (see Table 3.2), developing domestic productive 
capacity and investing in physical infrastructure and human capital (see Table 3 in 
Appendix).    
Under the second oil price shock in 1979-80 oil production and oil revenues increased in 
comparison with first oil price shock (see Fig. 3.1) but reached the same value of 58% of 
GDP and surplus reached 20% of GDP (see Table 3.2).  
Figure 3.1. Gross oil production for Saudi Arabia, 1970-2006 
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 Source: www.sama.gov.sa 
Table 3.2. Saudis Government oil revenues and finances 1970-2006 (% of GDP)23 
 Government Revenue 
Government Oil 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure Surplus 
1970 35,2 31,6 27,9 7,3 
1971 36,5 31,8 26,7 9,8 
1972 40,2 35,2 26,6 13,6 
1973 77,9 73,4 34,7 43,2 
1974 62,7 59,0 21,9 40,7 
1975 63,2 57,1 49,6 13,5 
1976 60,3 53,8 56,9 3,4 
1977 50,1 43,7 52,9 -2,8 
1978 48,3 42,3 54,4 -6,1 
1979 56,3 50,4 49,5 6,8 
                                              
23 Budget allocation for fiscal year 1991 was amalgamated with the budget allocation for 1990. 
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1980 63,7 58,4 43,3 20,4 
1981 59,2 52,8 45,8 13,4 
1982 47,0 35,5 46,7 0,2 
1983 46,4 32,6 51,7 -5,3 
1984 40,8 28,9 51,5 -10,7 
1985 35,5 23,5 48,9 -13,4 
1986 23,8 13,2 42,7 -18,9 
1987 32,4 21,0 57,6 -25,3 
1988 25,6 14,6 42,6 -17,0 
1989 32,1 21,3 43,4 -11,3 
1990     
1991 64,4 50,1 99,1 -34,7 
1992 33,2 25,2 46,8 -13,6 
1993 28,6 21,4 38,0 -9,4 
1994 25,6 19,0 32,6 -6,9 
1995 27,5 19,8 32,6 -5,1 
1996 30,3 23,0 33,5 -3,2 
1997 33,3 25,9 35,8 -2,6 
1998 25,9 14,6 34,8 -8,9 
1999 24,4 17,3 30,5 -6,0 
2000 36,5 30,3 33,3 3,2 
2001 33,2 26,8 37,2 -3,9 
2002 30,1 23,5 33,0 -2,9 
2003 36,4 28,7 31,9 4,5 
2004 41,8 35,2 30,4 11,4 
2005 47,7 42,7 29,3 18,4 
2006 51,5 46,2 30,1 22,2 
Source: www.sama.gov.sa   
Saudi Arabia tried to diversify production and to create valuable competitive tradable sectors 
to keep development and to raise economic growth. An important industry was 
manufacturing which had had very low level of development initially before oil shocks. But 
the emphasis was still kept on oil refining and petrochemicals rather than metals what didn’t 
mean actually truly diversification of production. In 1970-72 manufacturing industry which 
was capital- rather than labour-intensive industry generated 7% of GDP (see Table 4 in 
Appendix). Agriculture was just 4% of GDP with two-thirds of people employed there. Big 
subsidies were made to large farms in order to support dairy and wheat production24 in the 
north of the country whereas farms in the south-west remained poor and were the main 
source of employment. Social and economic infrastructure received a huge amount of 
                                              
24 In 1992 wheat production peaked at 4 million tonnes and absorbed almost $2 billion in subsidies (Financial Times 1996). 
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investment which was equal to 375 billion riyals in 1973. But the country was still highly 
dependent on costly supplies of desalinated water.  
The Third Development Plan (1980-85) (see Table 3 in Appendix) placed particular 
emphasis on agriculture, industry and mining  and limitation of foreign work force. 
Government tried to expand resource based industry involving joint ventures between state-
owned enterprises and multinational resource corporations for development of non-oil 
sectors and it benefited a lot from it.  
The oil price decrease in 1981 after the second oil price shock (see Figure 4.1) pushed Saudi 
Arabia to cut its production to less then one third of previous level (see Figure 3.1). By that 
means Saudi Arabia kept up oil prices and didn’t let them fall much. Only Saudi Arabia 
could take this kind of measures as it was dominant actor in OPEC and it had enormous 
reserves (see Figure 2.1). Other countries couldn’t react in the same way because their 
reserves were found later. Hence Saudi Arabia can be described as a swing producer.  
The oil price decrease in the beginning of 1980s brought decrease in oil revenues which 
reached its minimum equal to 13% of GDP in 1986 (see Table 3.2). Together with reduced 
oil revenues Saudis surplus transformed into continuous deficit since 1983. In the 1980s the 
taxation system was still based on the oil sector as in 1970s. Personal income tax was not 
levied and import taxes were set quite low. Besides, free government services and subsidies 
for fuel, water and electricity were granted. 
Other special features of Saudi Arabia were that the country was open to trade and to labour 
migration and that it had enormous foreign assets. Government accumulated them to avoid 
over-rapid absorption of oil revenues heavily spent on consumption and subsidies and to 
smooth fluctuations of the oil revenues. The accumulated overseas assets peaked at around 
$170 billion in the early 1980s and that was equivalent to over two-fifths of the oil revenue 
stream from the two previous oil booms25. However not all the money could be drawn upon 
because some of it was loaned to such country as Iran and became non-redeemable because 
of the war.  
                                              
25 Auty(2004) 
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In the 1990s oil revenues fluctuated a lot from 50 to 14% of GDP accompanied by 
government deficit. However the new oil price shock in 2003 brought surplus again and 
increased rapidly oil revenues to 29% of GDP (see Table 3.2).  
Hence Saudi Arabia is the example of the country with abundant oil reserves which invested 
heavily in the public sector in 1970s and didn’t support much its competitive private sector. 
It didn’t also manage to sustain economic growth of 1970s and started real diversification of 
its economy in 1990s when financial assets abroad were exhausted and domestic debt was 
accumulated. Saudi Arabia still remains highly dependent on oil resources which are not 
invested in the capital market and are kept in the ground. Due to its enormous oil reserves it 
can perform as a swing producer. 
3.2 Nigeria 
The main source for historical description of Nigeria is Ross (2003); limited series of data 
(mainly until 1987) are available online on the web-site of Nigeria’s National Bureau of 
Statistics (www.nigerianstat.gov.ng). 
Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in West Africa26 that has to pay vast external debt 
equal to $35,9 billion which comprises over $30 billion to the “Paris Club” group of 
creditors27 though it is world’s eighth oil exporter (see Table 3.1) and is among the fifteen 
world’s largest oil producers. Petrodollars invaded quickly the country and brought terrifying 
consequences: increased poverty and inequality, decreased life expectancy, brought 
corruption and black economy and damaged ecosystem. Now 85 percent of oil revenues 
accrue to 1 percent of the population; of $400 billion in revenues, perhaps $100 billion have 
simply gone “missing” since 197028. 
Nigeria became one of the oil strategic players right after the civil war that was started in 
1967. In 1969 when the war was finished Nigeria seemed to begin its recovering being 
                                              
26 Every fifth in Africa lives in Nigeria; two thirds of the population that amount to over 90 million people live on less than 
one dollar per day in 2005 compared with 19 million in 1970s; every fifth child dies before its fifth birthday 
(www.oxfam.org.uk) 
27 Justice for Nigeria: why the UK should return to Nigeria’s £1,7 billion to fight poverty (2006), www.oxfam.org.uk   
28 Watts (2006) 
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characterized by potentially large domestic market and a resilient agricultural sector.  In 
1971 it joined OPEC as its eleventh member. The following oil shocks brought country 
below pre-shock levels of development.  
Nigeria has been dependent on oil exports since the first oil price shock and was receiving 
99,6 percent of its export income from oil in 1973-74 29 compared to oil export in the end of 
1950s that was equal just to two percent. In 1960s-70s eight companies got license to 
explore oil in Nigeria, and a special governmental agency the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation was set up. A state-led program was launched to modernize economy. The “oil 
complex” emerged and was meant to be a core of the economy.  
Oil output was equal to 823 million barrels (see Fig. 3.2) and government revenue from oil 
reached 21,56 percent of GDP in 1974 (see Table 3.3). Besides doubling of oil revenues the 
positive oil price shock in 1973-74 brought government surplus, however not for a long time 
(see Table 3.3). During the following years oil revenues were quite stable due to stable oil 
taxes. The next shock in 1979-80 repeated the success of the first shock raising oil revenues 
to 28% of GDP and changing deficit to surplus again (see Table 3.3). That convinced 
Nigerian government to rely on the oil sector in the long-term. 
Spending of oil resources was mainly aimed at increasing GDP growth, even through 
doubling of wages in the public sector. The situation in the non-oil sectors, especially in 
agriculture, was much worse. Agriculture supposed to be a cushion during recession times 
for Nigeria, however government didn’t think about it and made very small investments in 
this sector targeting mainly large farms and forgetting about small peasant farms. That 
yielded a poor return and led to severe “Dutch Disease” in agricultural sector. Besides the 
growth of manufacturing sector was very unstable because it had been underdeveloped from 
the pre-shock times (see Table 5 in Appendix). Furthermore a concentration of resource 
wealth in one region, and attempts by other regions to gain a share of it, contributed to the 
breakup and eventual re-establishment of centralized political power30. So government tried 
to improve the situation and to gain political support by spending on infrastructure. Hence 
prime expenditures on education and roads should have demonstrated the effective use of oil 
                                              
29 Ross (2003) 
30 Lopez, Toman (2006) 
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revenues to the population and should have been a signal for changes in society. Besides 
large investments were made in manufacture but had very low efficacy due to high cost 
overruns and operational difficulties. The growth of manufacturing sector was very unstable 
because it had been underdeveloped from the pre-shock times. Moreover the problem was 
that mainly urban citizens benefited from these expenditures, and gap between urban and 
rural population was continuously growing. In addition employment opportunities enhanced 
migration from rural areas to towns.  
Increase in government spending didn’t cause the expected growth in GDP since 1980. 
Besides Nigeria saved very little. Strong increase in demand due to oil production and 
limited elastic supply spilled into consumption of imported goods and into other monetary 
transfers and payments for additional services31.  
Figure 3.2. Gross oil production for Nigeria, 1970-2006 
 
Source: www.bp.com  
 
Table 3.3. Nigerian Federal Government oil revenues and finances 1970-1987(% of GDP) 32 
 Government Revenue 
Government Oil 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure Surplus 
1970 5,0 3,8 10,1 -5,1 
1971 7,5 5,8 6,41 1,1 
1972 12,7 10,4 13,3 -0,5 
1973 13,8 11,6 10,3 3,6 
                                              
31 Schatz (1984) 
32 Series stop early due to the availability of data.  
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1974 23,1 21,6 13,9 9,2 
1975 24,0 22,4 25,9 -1,9 
1976 23,7 22,3 27,5 -3,8 
1977 24,0 22,7 26,3 -2,3 
1978 18,9 16,9 21,8 -2,9 
1979 25,4 25,1 17,3 8,2 
1980 30,3 28,3 28,1 2,2 
1981 23,6 21,5 21,2 2,37 
1982 19,5 16,8 23,0 -3,4 
1983 18,4 12,7 16,9 1,5 
1984 17,5 12,9 15,0 2,5 
1985 20,2 15,1 17,5 2,7 
1986 16,8 11,1 22,2 -5,4 
1987 23,1 17,5 20,2 2,8 
Source: www.nigerianstat.gov.ng   
After first oil shock in 1973-74 Nigeria increased its foreign exchange reserves but then 
government changed its policy. By 1978 all the savings abroad were spent and after a short 
break in the form of the second oil shock in 1979-1980 the country became again net 
borrower. Started from in $567 million in 1970 the foreign debt boosted up to $24,5 billion 
in 1986 with interest repayment to GDP of over 56%33. Nigeria as Mexico used its oil 
resources as collateral to borrow money in foreign banks and then the huge part of it was 
spent intensively on consumption. The rest was spent on investments that were made often in 
projects with negative net present values or financing the budget deficit. Besides some 
money was spent on finance the consumption of imported goods.  
During the 1980s oil production and oil revenues were highly volatile (see Fig. 3.2 and Table 
3.3). However the sharp oil price drop in 1986 brought decrease in oil revenues to 11% of 
GDP and deficit equal to 5% of GDP.  
Hence in 1986 the two-year Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was established to 
address the debt problem with the following major objects34: 
• to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce 
dependence on the oil sector and imports; 
• to achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability over the period; 
                                              
33 World Bank Debt Statisitcs (1988) 
34 Ezeala-Harrison (1993) 
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• to lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary, or minimal inflationary growth; 
• to lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector and 
improve the sector's efficiency, and intensify the growth potential of the private 
sector. 
SAP gave the following advantages: the debt service ratio was rescheduled and consisted 
below 40 % compared with 76,4 % in 1987. Besides, Nigeria received a new loan of $452 
million from the World Bank. 
Hence looking at the Table 3.3 we see that oil revenues and government surplus were quite 
volatile. The average for surplus is equal to 0,6% of GDP that is not so bad. Every time 
Nigeria had deficit it just borrowed new loan hoping to recover fast. Now it has accumulated 
a huge debt that it has to repay. Hence Nigeria is the example of the mere spending of oil 
revenues which turned out to be a curse for the country. Schatz (1984) described the 
economy of Nigeria as “Pirate capitalism” meaning that government and those who 
exploited oil revenues pursued just short-term goals of skimming oil revenues in 1970s and 
1980s and didn’t constitute the goals of long–term wealth spreading. The consequences of 
that are reflected in the present economic situation. 
3.3 Mexico 
The main source which was used here is Everhart and Duval-Hernandez (2001); data are 
taken from the web-site of Banco de Mexico (www.banxico.org.mx).  
Mexico is also one of the main examples of the resource curse. It experienced negative 
macroeconomic influence of resource abundance like some other countries that rely on oil 
export. Since the beginning of twentieth century Mexico has started to spend the oil 
windfalls. In 1938 the oil sector was nationalized initiating the full state control. At the same 
time there was fast development of manufacturing and service sectors and the oil sector got 
diminishing importance. By the beginning of 1970s, the oil sector represented only 2,5 
percent of GDP and 3,5 percent of federal government tax revenues35. In 1956 -1970 Mexico 
experienced phase of Stable Development (the so-called “desarrollo estabilizador”) after 
                                              
35 Everhart, Duval-Hernandez (2001) 
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which followed rising level of inflation, greater government’s intervention in the economy, a 
large foreign debt in order to sustain economic growth and an overvalued exchange rate. In 
1976 a balance of payment crisis happened, due to the fleeing of the private capital out of the 
country. Government had to abandon fixed exchange rate regime and hence peso was 
devalued by 40 percent.  
During the first oil price shock oil revenue didn’t increase significantly and country 
experienced small deficit (see Table 3.4). In the late 1970s oil production became more and 
more important (see Figure 3.3). Besides, Mexico invested huge amounts of money and used 
oil as collateral as it assumed that the 1979 oil shock heralded a permanent improvement in 
the country’s terms of trade and used money instead of saving it36. Moreover, Mexico 
exploited oil reserves to avoid the opening of its overprotected manufacturing sector which 
lead to boosted inflation and stopped non-oil export growth. In 1979-81 oil boom was 
intensified by an increase in public spending. Besides government deficit also ballooned in 
1979-81 accompanied by increasing oil revenues until 1985. Lower import prices because of 
a real exchange rate appreciation lead to further increasing consumption boom while 
personal tax increase was not introduced. By 1982 the whole non-oil economy became non-
tradable, which means that it needed constant subsidising or protection by state37. In 1982 
the government changed its strategy from autocratic regime and started to work towards 
stabilisation and market reforms. It managed to decrease expenditures as subsidies were 
cancelled and public investments also went down at the same time. 
The main purpose of spending oil revenues for Mexican government was financing of large 
public investment projects38, mainly of low return like military and bureaucratic ones. But 
expectations about oil prices were too bright and potential large revenues deterred money 
from other economic sectors and programs. That is why Mexican economy became weaker 
reflecting the fragility of funding the economy with oil money.  
The 1986 oil price shock decreased oil revenues to 5% of GDP, brought recession and 
intensified deficit to 13% of GDP (see Table 3.4). Oil production continued to increase (see 
                                              
36 Auty (2004) 
37 Auty (1994) 
38 Everhart, Duval-Hernandez (2001) 
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Figure 3.3. Gross oil production for Mexico, 1970-2006 
 
Source: www.bp.com 
 
Table 3.4. Mexican Federal Government oil revenues and finances 1971-2006 (% of GDP) 
 
Federal 
Government 
Revenue 
Federal 
Government Oil 
Revenue 
Federal 
Government 
Expenditure 
Deficit 
1971 9,2 1,5 10,3 1,1 
1972 9,4 1,4 11,5 2,1 
1973 10,1 1,3 12,9 2,8 
1974 10,6 1,7 13,5 3,0 
1975 11,6 1,7 16,0 4,4 
1976 11,9 1,7 16,0 4,1 
1977 12,5 1,6 16,3 3,8 
1978 13,0 1,7 16,4 3,4 
1979 13,5 2,0 16,9 3,4 
1980 15,3 4,0 18,1 2,8 
1981 15,3 4,2 21,5 6,3 
1982 15,6 5,9 27,1 11,5 
1983 17,8 8,0 25,9 8,1 
1984 16,9 7,3 24,3 7,5 
1985 16,9 7,2 24,6 7,7 
1986 16,0 5,6 28,9 12,9 
1987 17,1 6,9 31,2 14,2 
1988 16,3 5,0 25,5 9,8 
1989 16,4 4,7 21,4 5,0 
1990 15,9 4,2 18,5 2,6 
1991 18,7 4,0 15,3 -0,2 
1992 18,7 4,2 14,6 -1,5 
1993 15,5 3,8 14,7 -0,8 
1994 15,5 3,7 15,5 0,4 
1995 15,2 4,9 15,9 0,7 
1996 15,5 5,3 15,9 0,4 
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1997 15,8 5,2 17,1 1,3 
1998 14,2 3,9 15,9 1,7 
1999 14,7 4,0 16,6 1,9 
2000 15,8 5,2 17,4 1,6 
2001 16,2 4,9 17,3 1,1 
2002 15,8 4,2 18,1 2,3 
2003 16,4 5,2 17,9 1,5 
2004 16,5 5,8 17,8 1,3 
2005 16,9 6,5 18,1 1,2 
2006 17,0 5,9 19,0 2,0 
Source: www.banxico.org.mx   
Fig. 3.3) but deficit hit economy until 1991.  In the middle of 1980s to the end of the decade 
Mexico continued struggling trying to diverse export structure, opening the economy and 
broadening the participation of the private sector. Though the oil price was fluctuating 
around 20 US dollars per barrel, the oil exports declined sharply from 7 percent in 1987 to 
3,7 percent in 1993 (see Table 3.4). It happened because government changed its policy. 
More or less the export of oil was stabilized in the second part of 1990s and didn’t fluctuate 
dramatically – just around 4-5 percent of GDP.  
The fall in the oil price in 1997-1998 was quite unexpected and harsh (12,08 US dollars per 
barrel (see Figure 4.1) - the lowest value in two last decades) and the strategy was still to 
increase oil production and oil export and to invest in oil infrastructure. In 1998 the 
PIDIREGAS investment agreement was concluded. It means that infrastructure investments 
are financed with the help of private sector. Some projects will become public investment as 
the government repays its debt to the private sector, others will become private investment 
with a long-term supply contract39.  
In 2000s Mexico has continued the same strategy of intensified oil production (see Fig. 3.3). 
However deficit didn’t turn to surplus though oil revenues have increased slightly and have 
been fluctuating around 6% of GDP (see Table 3.4).  
Manufacturing sector and services played important role in the creating of Mexican GDP. As 
in Nigeria agricultural sector didn’t become cushion for economy and decreased 
significantly during the last 40 years (see Table 6 in Appendix). The same happened to 
manufacturing sector despite all investments programs, government protection and 
                                              
39 Everhart, Duval-Hernandez (2001) 
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development programmes. Nowadays the country is still hit by recession, inflation and 
poverty. 
3.4 Norway 
The main source for historical description of Norway is Larsen (2004); all data are available 
on-line on the web-site of Statistisk Sentralbyrå (www.ssb.no).  
Norway being the forth largest oil net exporter in 200640 started to play its significant role at 
the international oil market quite recently – namely, since the second half of 1970s. In the 
late 1960s expectations about finding oil in the North Sea were realized. The exploration 
started in 1966 but oil was found only in 1969. The oil era coincided with first energy crisis 
and the quadrupling of oil prices, which was further fuelled by continued discoveries and a 
new oil price hike after the revolution in Iran in 197941. Significantly oil production started 
only in 1975 and then it was constantly rising until 1997 (see Figure 3.4). The value of 
production decreased severely in 1986 but increased volume of production helped to raise it 
again in the late 1980s.  
Government balance (see Table 3.5) fluctuated quite a lot in 1978-2006 influenced by the 
petroleum sector. In the mid-1970s there were made huge investments to human capital, real 
capital and technology in the oil sector. It took a while before oil revenues started to be 
sufficiently high to cover budget deficit. This partly explains the negative values of 
government values in the mid-1970s (see Fig. 5 in Appendix). 
The second oil price shock in 1979-80 influenced slightly oil revenues as oil production just 
started (see Table 3.5). The sharp decline of oil prices in 1986 reflected far more negatively 
on oil revenues which diminished sharply from 9% to 3% of GDP.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
40 www.eia.doe.gov  
41 Hannesson (2001) 
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Figure 3.4. Gross crude oil production (thousand barrels daily) 
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Source: www.bp.com  
Table 3.5. Norwegian Government oil revenues and finances 1978-2006 (% of GDP) 
 Government Revenue 
Government Oil 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure Surplus 
1978 46,1 2,5 45,1 1,0 
1979 46,5 3,7 44,4 2,1 
1980 49,1 7,3 43,8 5,4 
1981 48,0 7,3 43,2 4,8 
1982 47,7 7,2 43,8 3,9 
1983 49,4 7,8 43,5 6,0 
1984 48,5 8,5 41,6 6,9 
1985 50,8 9,3 41,0 9,7 
1986 50,3 3,3 44,5 5,8 
1987 51,3 2,5 46,8 4,5 
1988 51,2 1,6 48,6 2,6 
1989 50,1 2,7 48,3 1,8 
1990 51,3 4,5 48,8 2,5 
1991 50,0 4,4 49,8 0,1 
1992 49,5 4,0 51,2 -1,7 
1993 48,8 4,1 50,2 -1,4 
1994 49,7 4,1 49,3 0,4 
1995 50,4 4,2 47,0 3,4 
1996 51,2 6,7 44,8 6,5 
1997 50,7 6,9 43,0 7,7 
1998 48,9 3,2 45,6 3,3 
1999 50,2 5,2 44,2 6,0 
2000 54,7 13,1 39,3 15,4 
2001 54,3 11,8 41,0 13,3 
2002 53,2 10,1 44,0 9,2 
2003 52,8 10,3 45,5 7,3 
2004 53,8 12,2 42,6 11,1 
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2005 54,6 14,9 39,5 15,1 
2006 56,9 16,3 38,3 18,6 
Source: www.ssb.no 
The rapid decline in manufactures export (see Figure 1 in Appendix) from 62 percent of 
merchandise exports in 1975 to 30 percent in 1984 and a decline in shipping shows the fast 
exclusion of these industries by oil industry. However this tendency was not as negative as 
in Mexico, Nigeria or Saudi Arabia as Norway had already been developed country with 
extensive physical infrastructure in addition to well-endowed systems of higher education 
and science42. Besides the important factor was the absence of rent-seeking explained by 
mature political and economic institutions. Norway experienced just restructuring of the 
economy and it didn’t lead to the future problems as the reduction in the demand for training 
and education, a gradual erosion of the overall economic capacity, of the production capacity 
in the non-resource traded goods sector, or both43. The Figure 2 in Appendix shows that the 
dependence on oil revenues was not increasing over time as in the countries hit by the Dutch 
Disease. From 1983 to 1988 the fraction of oil and natural gas in GDP was decreasing and 
from 1990 to 2000 it was fluctuating around 15 percent. Besides the export was varied and 
not just concentrated in the export of oil. Moreover the Norwegian oil sector commanded a 
fairly small and constant share of total labour hours44 since the oil fields were allocated 
under the sea floor and not on-land as in the case of Saudi Arabia. So the oil sector needed 
huge capital and technology investments and was low labour-intensive. In other words, 
despite building up large liabilities for starting production, the oil resources were not an 
obstacle for further developing of the economy.  
The following years from 1980s up to 2000s oil revenues had years of stability and 
increasing tendency (see Table 3.5). Norway experienced government deficit only in 1992-
93 when economy was hit by crisis. In 20003-06, though it was found that oil reserves are 
not so large and it was decided to produce less, oil revenues increased due to positive shock 
in oil prices up to 16% of GDP giving the country growing surplus up to 18% of GDP (see 
Table 3.5). 
                                              
42 Humphreys et al (2007) 
43 Larsen (2004) 
44 Larsen (2004) 
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Norwegian system of the centralised wage bargaining prevented the country from 
uncontrolled and fast real appreciation thus keeping the Norwegian economy away from de-
industrialisation (see Cappelen, Eika and Holm (2000)). It is productivity in the 
manufacturing sector and not in the oil sector which was the guiding line for the general 
wage level thus not giving it to increase strongly. This made the effect of the oil sector upon 
the non-oil traded sectors more moderate (see Table 7 in Appendix).  
Other problems which were successfully solved were the absorption of petroleum wealth in 
the domestic economy and the regulation of the demand. To tackle these fiscal policy 
difficulties, Norwegian government decided to establish the Norwegian State Petroleum 
Fund in 1990 (see Figure 3 in Appendix). Besides, to slow nominal appreciation the fund is 
kept in foreign currencies. The money is invested in different securities, namely government 
bonds, shares and derivatives. The preference of the fund is conservative strategy, namely 
low return and safety.  The first donations to the fund were made only in 1995 when the 
economy recovered after severe recession in 1990-92.   
The Norwegian State Petroleum Fund accumulates resources in the form of transfers if there 
is budget surplus and withdraws resources if there is budget deficit. Thus the Norwegian 
State Petroleum Fund effectively finances the overall budget balance45. The Fund is 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance and its assets are managed by Norwegian Central Bank 
(Norges Bank). The main rules of the Fund are good governance, transparency and 
accountability.  
 The main functions of the fund are46: 
• The Oil Fund’s key function is to diversify petroleum wealth into a broad portfolio of 
international securities (see Figure 4 in Appendix); 
• This transition reduces the expected risk significantly and increases expected return; 
• The Fund makes the income stream from non-renewable resources permanent; 
                                              
45 Davis et al (2001) 
46 Knut N.Kjaer (March 2008)  
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• The intention is to spend only the (expected) real return through annual public 
budgets, thus preserving the fund’s capital for future generations.  
The Petroleum Fund was turned into a pension fund in 2006 to pay out the pensions for those 
who have been already retired. As the number of pensioners is growing and the number of 
workers is decreasing, the pension burden should be alleviated. In Norway it has been done 
with the help of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund.  
Hence Norway is the example of the country, which managed to handle the oil revenues in 
the right way. Norwegian government has been successful in sustaining the economic 
growth, diversifying economy and preparing the country for the future without oil. The 
society of welfare has been built, and its essential principles are market-orientated 
management of the oil wealth, the conception of the oil resources as a taxable common 
property and mature politico-economic institutions and policy-making.  
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4. Comparison of four main oil exporters 
Considering the oil price history the four main shocks can be marked out: the oil booms in 
1973-74 and 1978-79, the negative oil shock in 1986 and recent jump in oil price in 2003-05 
(see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1. Historical crude oil prices 
 
Source: www.bp.com 
 
The major oil-exporting countries reacted differently to the shocks – not only in comparison 
with each other but also in time. To understand the economic responses to the shocks the 
government and country’s finances of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico and Norway were 
studied and their statistics was used as a base for subsequent graphs. Analyzing the graphs 
and the economic history we shall try to figure out how governments injected oil windfalls in 
the countries’ economies, which spending patterns they followed and what factors influenced 
them.  Namely changes in public finances and in current account are considered (see Figures 
5-8 in Appendix, Figures 4.5-4.7). These figures show difference between averages 
calculated for the years before and after oil price shocks. During oil price shock itself there is 
an immediate effect on oil revenues, government surplus etc. but it takes time to adjust tax 
system afterwards. That is why it was needed to look at the period after the shock. However 
it is difficult to say if the changes in public finances and finances of the country’s level 
considered here were caused by oil price shocks only or some other factors.  
So for the first oil price shock in 1973-74 there were calculated averages in 1971-72 and in 
1975-76. Then their difference was depicted on Figure 5 in Appendix. For the second oil 
price shock in 1979-80 the period considered before shock is 1977-78 and the period 
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considered after the shock is 1981-82. The averages for these two periods were calculated. 
Then again the difference between these two averages was used (see Figure 6 in Appendix).  
For the third oil price shock in 1986 the averages for the period before the shock (1984-85) 
and the period after the shock (1987-88) were calculated and after that their difference was 
depicted (see Figure 7 in Appendix). For the last oil price shock in 2003-04 the period before 
shock is 2001-02 and the period after shock is 2005-06. The difference of the averages for 
these two periods is depicted on Figure 8 in Appendix.    
Generally speaking there are three strategies that could be followed by resource-rich 
countries. First one is to spend oil income on current consumption and domestic investment. 
This strategy seemed to be popular in 1970s for developing countries whose development 
level was quite low and which desperately needed immediate improvement in the life 
quality. Besides absence of strong institutions created fears that oil windfalls would have 
been distributed unevenly. Hence government trying to win support of the population had to 
spend resources on consumption. However this policy can work out only for the countries 
with large oil reserves (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria). Besides precise long-term predictions about 
future oil prices are required which is hard to make. 
Another strategy is quite conservative and lies in saving of all oil revenues and investing 
them abroad that gives the interest income to the country.  The fruits of such behavior are 
postponed to the future and the population should absolutely trust to the government. This 
policy can be applied in the country with small oil reserves, which already achieved high 
level of development and institution system and diversified economy, for example as 
Norway. Advantage of this strategy is absence of dependency on highly volatile oil prices. 
Moreover higher than projected oil prices – or a better than expected performance of an oil 
field – are translated into more foreign assets, not more current expenditure47. 
If we look at the average optimal spending rates found in the Chapter 2 (see Fig. 2.3) we will 
see that the highest one was for Saudi Arabia. Then it was followed by Nigeria with big gap. 
Mexico and Norway had the smallest optimal spending rates very close to each other but still 
higher one for Mexico. Hence we see that these findings correspond with the two strategies 
stated above and chosen by the countries themselves.  
                                              
47 Setser (2007) 
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The third strategy is a strategy of permanent consumption, besides oil revenues which are 
left are invested in financial assets abroad to create dividends and interest payments. When 
oil resources are depleted, the income from financial assets will create a buffer for the 
economy. The disadvantage of that strategy is that it is difficult to make an accurate long-
term forecast about oil price, oil reserves and interest rate for the foreign assets.  
4.1. Government finances 
4.1.1. Government oil revenues 
The first characteristic I would like to discuss is government oil revenues. As we see on Fig. 
4.1 the oil revenues were highly volatile for all four countries48. Under the oil price shock in 
1973-74 oil revenues rose significantly for Saudi Arabia and Nigeria and negligibly for 
Mexico. Under the following shock in 1979-80 the reaction was quite stronger for all four 
countries. The 1986 year and the following years brought sharp decrease for oil revenues. If 
we look at the recent data since 2003 (see Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5) constant increase in the 
share of oil revenues in GDP could be noticed. Therefore the share of oil revenues is quite 
unstable. However that could be explained not only by oil price and oil output changes but 
also by changes in output from other sectors, especially in the longer term.   
Figure 4.1. Government oil revenues (% of GDP), 1970 - 200649  
 
 
Source: www.sama.gov.sa, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, www.ssb.no   
                                              
48 The data for Nigeria is absent after 1987 (see www.nigerianstat.gov.ng). 
49 There are gaps in the data for Saudi Arabia and Nigeria due to its exposition on-line (see www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, 
www.sama.gov.sa). The same explanation is applied further.  
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4.1.2 Government surplus 
The item of government finances that is of particular interest and that is influenced indirectly 
by oil revenues is government’s surplus. We see on Figure 4.2 that during 1973-74 the 
governments of Saudi Arabia and Nigeria had very high budget surplus. However it is 
remarkable that Mexico had almost always budget deficit despite additional revenue from 
oil. In 1979-80 there is noticed increase in government’s surplus for Saudi Arabia, Nigeria 
and Norway and reduction in deficit for Mexico that coincide with increase in oil revenues 
that time. Decrease in oil revenues in 1986 corresponds with sharpening of oil deficit for the 
three countries except Norway, which had government’s surplus but also experienced 
reduction in it.  Recent rise in oil revenues helped Saudi Arabia to change its deficit to 
surplus since 2003. Norway had considerable increase in its surplus. However Mexico still 
couldn’t change its deficit to surplus. 
Hence we see that there is certain kind of interconnection between government oil revenues 
and government surplus/deficit. So let’s look closer and figure out how change in oil 
revenues influenced the change in government surplus.  
Figure 4.2. Government surplus (% of GDP), 1970 - 2006 
 
Source: www.sama.gov.sa, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, www.ssb.no   
4.1.3 Change in government finances  
First let’s look at the 1973-74 oil shock when oil price jumped from 3$ to 12$ (see Fig. 4.1) 
and compare the change in government finances before and after the shock, i.e. compare the 
average in 1971-72 with the average in 1975-76 (see Fig. 5 in Appendix). Increase in the oil 
revenues took place: Saudi Arabia experienced the strongest influence – 22% of GDP 
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against 14,3% of GDP in Nigeria and 0,2% of GDP in Mexico. The small increase for 
Mexico could be explained by the fact that oil didn’t play a great role in the Mexican 
economy that time. In the beginning of 1970s mentioned countries just started their 
development and this positive oil price shock strengthened their wish to rely on easy oil-
money: oil abundance seemed to be “bless”.  
Concerning government surplus Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico had decrease in it almost 
of the same size: 2,65% of GDP for Mexico, 3,13% of GDP for Nigeria and 3,2% of GDP 
for Saudi Arabia (see Fig. 5 in Appendix). This tendency could be explained by that the 
shock has immediate effect on government surplus but it takes time to adjust tax system after 
it has gone. That is why in 1975-76 surplus fall below its initial level in 1971-72. Besides 
there was increase in government expenditures supported by the belief that positive oil price 
shock would be permanent. Mexico had high increase in government expenditures in 
comparison with increase in oil revenues equal to 5,13% of GDP. Increase in government 
expenditures in Saudi Arabia and Nigeria is better comparable with increase in oil revenues 
(see Fig. 5 in Appendix). 
On the whole the influence of the first oil shock was not dramatic as countries just started 
development of their economies relying on oil income.  
The second oil price shock when oil price jumped from 14$ to 31$ (see Fig. 4.1) 
strengthened belief of the governments in the permanence of high oil prices. Comparing 
average of oil revenues in 1977-78 and in 1981-82 (see Fig. 6 in Appendix) Saudi Arabia, 
Mexico and Norway experienced increase with the largest increase in Norway equal to 
4,76% of GDP (partly due to rapidly increasing oil production) and more modest in Saudi 
Arabia and Mexico – 1,2% of GDP and 3,38% of GDP, whereas Nigeria had decrease in oil 
revenues equal to 0,63% of GDP due to decreasing production as well.  As Saudi Arabia was 
a leading actor in OPEC and discovered huge oil reserves it performed as a swing producer 
in 1980s. It cut its oil production in order to support oil prices at a high level after the second 
oil price shock. It was helpful as oil prices didn’t decline so acute (see Fig. 4.1). 
Concerning change in government surplus before and after 1979-80 three countries except 
Mexico had increase equal to 11% of GDP in Saudi Arabia, 3,3% of GDP in Norway and 
2,07% of GDP in Nigeria (see Fig. 6 in Appendix). Increase in Mexican government deficit 
was around 5% of GDP. These facts exactly corresponds with decrease in government 
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expenditures: 7,4% of GDP in Saudi Arabia, 1,6% of GDP in Norway and 1,9% of GDP in 
Nigeria and increase in Mexico equal to 8% of GDP.  
 A big fall in oil price happened in 1986 when oil price reached the level of 14,43$ per barrel 
(see Fig. 4.1). Three countries except for Nigeria which had higher level of production 
before and after the shock had fall in oil revenues: it was equal to 8,4% of GDP for Saudi 
Arabia, 1,29% of GDP for Mexico and 6,85% of GDP for Norway (see Fig. 7 in Appendix). 
As government surplus is closely linked to oil revenues in the oil-exporting countries, it also 
went down in Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Norway. Its decline was equal to 9,1% of GDP in 
Saudi Arabia, 4,12% of GDP in Mexico and to 4,77% of GDP in Norway. Nigeria had 
negligible increase in government surplus equal to 0,26% of GDP while increase in oil 
revenues was equal to 3,5% of GDP.  
Despite the negative shock Nigeria had increase in government expenditures equal to 3,95% 
of GDP and Mexico as well where increase was equal almost to 4% of GDP. Norway had the 
highest increase in government expenditures amounted to 6,4% of GDP. Change in Saudi 
government expenditures was negligible – it declined on 0,1% of GDP. It can be explained 
by decreased oil revenues after the shock in 1986.  
The next oil price shock is recent increase in oil prices in 2003-2004 when oil price reached 
38$ per barrel (see Fig. 4.1)50. This influenced positively growth of oil revenues in Saudi 
Arabia, Norway and Mexico: they increased on 19,3% of GDP, 4,63% of GDP and 1,7% of 
GDP correspondingly (see Fig. 8 in Appendix). Nevertheless government surplus in contrast 
to 1980s increased everywhere. One reason may be that the price continued to go up, so 
“after” is not really after (see Fig. 4.1). The highest raise in surplus experienced Saudi 
Arabia that was equal to 23,7% of GDP, then it was Norway with the growth equal to 5,6% 
of GDP and finally Mexico with modest increase equal to 0,085% of GDP (see Fig. 8 in 
Appendix).  As for government expenditures they declined in Saudi Arabia and Norway 
amounting to 5,4% of GDP and 3,6% of GDP. In contrast Mexico is the only country which 
had increase in government expenditures equal to 0,86% of GDP.  
                                              
50 In this section only Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Norway are discussed because data for Nigerian government finances is 
available only until 1987.  
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Increase in government surpluses under the second oil price shock generated a possibility to 
have rapid GDP growth which could be sustainable with the help of oil money. In the 
beginning of 1970s Nigeria tried to save extra oil revenues but lately government decided to 
cut down savings and accelerated spending reckoning oil price increase as permanent. 
Foreign debts which were taken to support government deficit but became unsustainable in 
1980s worsened the situation. The left-leaning Mexican government spent the revenues 
basically to decrease poverty and to smooth social tensions introducing official stabilization 
program in 1975.  Saudi Arabia which specialty is small population and large oil reserves 
decided to use its oil windfalls in the development of social and economic infrastructure. 
However Saudi Arabia having paternalistic autocracy wasn’t forced to accelerate spending in 
order to pursue short-terms goals to have support of the population as in Nigeria and Mexico. 
It rather decided to make large allocations in foreign assets to regulate domestic absorption 
capacity.  
Under the decrease of oil prices in 1986 Nigerian and Mexican oil income was used as 
collateral to attract foreign capital to the country in order to sustain economic growth. 
Excessive large cost investments’ projects in transportation, primary education, mining, 
manufacturing and infrastructure were also started. All these activities outstripped domestic 
absorption capacity. Besides the quality of investments dropped as investments projects were 
carried out without proper attention to their economic viability, coordination, or sequencing, 
and with few safeguards against waste and corruption51.  The rest of the oil revenues was 
spent as subsidies because national currency appreciated and to substitution of decreased 
(Mexico and Nigeria) or abolished personal tax (Saudi Arabia). Competitive industrialization 
was distorted. So governments of developing countries understood that some stabilization 
measures should be adopted. Incoming Nigerian government introduced a program of fiscal 
austerity in 1983, including across-the-board budget cuts, reduced imports, and foreign 
exchange rationing that resulted in many unfinished projects52. Saudi Arabia elaborated 
Third Development Plan for 1980-85 trying to sustain the economic growth and to diversify 
production promoting agriculture, industry and mining. New Mexican government also took 
measures in 1982 cutting public expenditures, removing subsidies and decreasing public 
investments.  
                                              
51 World Bank (2007)  
52 World Bank (2007) 
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Norwegian government in contrast interpreted oil price shocks as temporary and didn’t 
consider oil as a permanent source of income. It was decided to stick to the conservative 
strategy and to save income which government got from the oil extraction rationally in order 
to have fair distribution of the oil wealth among generations. 
Generally speaking here we see that the reaction of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico was 
similar in 1970s. The increase in oil revenues associated with increase in government 
expenditures. Norway also followed this pattern in the beginning of 1970s having 
government deficit (see Fig. 5 in Appendix) but it stuck to the safe strategy of saving oil 
revenues. The negative shock in 1986 resulted in the far more individual reaction of each 
country and deepened the emerging differences among them. The lessons learnt from the 
history of oil using in the previous century lead to that countries changed their strategy of 
having positive relation between change in oil revenues and change in government 
expenditures.  Diversification of production, the increase of the role of non-oil private sector 
and savings of oil revenues abroad became new common features of oil-producing countries.   
Hence from looking at the change of government finances the pattern that can be traced is 
the following one: after finding oil developing countries relied heavily on oil revenues 
pursuing high GDP level without preventing the country from currency devaluation, 
overabsorption of oil money and finally inflation. They set short-term goals and were not 
bothered by the ideas of economic stability and equal distribution among the generations that 
is found to be optimal in theory. Consequently the considered countries except Norway had 
severe “boom-bust” cycles53 caused by highly volatile oil revenues. But as the time showed 
the strategy of fast oil money spending failed and now the developing countries are trying to 
repeat the success of Norway which is known for its egalitarian values. 
Among the factors that made Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico spent much of oil revenues 
on current consumption and investment were their political regimes. Eifert et al (2003) in 
their article defined four types of regimes, and these countries exactly represent each of 
them: Saudi Arabia has paternalistic autocracy, Nigeria has predatory autocracy, Mexico has 
factional democracy and finally Norway has mature democracy. So economic options of 
using oil revenues were already imposed by the state structure which defines information 
                                              
53 Eifert B. et al (2003) 
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transparency, institutional accountability, market competition and the significance of oil and 
non-oil traded sectors.  
4.2 Whole country’s level finances 
4.2.1 Gross savings 
 Now let’s look not only at the government finance but also at the whole country’s level 
analyzing gross savings and current account balance. Comparing gross savings gives us 
interesting result which is different from the result obtained by calculating the optimal 
spending rates in Chapter 2: the real spending rates are quite smaller than the optimal ones 
(compare Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 9 in Appendix). The low spending rate for Norway coincides with 
the actual behaviour of the country which follows a conservative strategy with respect to 
uncertain future oil prices. Norwegian government prefers not to spend money before they 
have got it. For other small countries with big oil reserves like for example Saudi Arabia 
government has another strategy – first the country has to borrow money to start production. 
Then there is a choice: to spend a lot of oil windfall today or to make taxes low in order to 
smooth consumption. If oil price decreases, then government which relies heavily on oil 
revenues and has debt is in big trouble. Moreover, it takes time to understand if the oil price 
shock is temporary or permanent. So the safest strategy is to have in mind that a positive 
shock is always temporary and a negative shock is always permanent. Hence government 
which is following this strategy will save a lot but unfortunately will have uneven 
consumption.  
Theory predicting negative relations between gross savings and the ratio of oil reserves to oil 
production fits well for Saudi Arabia and Norway. Gross savings decreased for Saudi Arabia 
on 53% if we compare the 1980 level with the level in 2002 (see Fig. 9 in Appendix). It is 
explained by increase in the ratio of oil reserves to oil production on 218% from 1980 to 
2002 due to the discovery of new oil reserves. After 1981 gross savings started to decline 
though the oil price was decreasing as well. In 1986 when the oil price had large decline 
Saudis gross savings were very low – just 1,14% of GDP and reached their minimum equal 
to 1,01% of GDP next year whereas the ratio of oil reserves to oil production declined 
sharply in 1986 from 148 to 97 due to increased production. After that gross savings have 
had increasing trend up till now with the visible decline in 1991, 1994 and 1998 as a reaction 
 51
to economy recession and oil price shocks. The ratio was quite stable in 1991-1997, after 
that it had small decline in 1998, peak in 2002 and a declining trend again from 2002 to 
2006.  
Norway had the opposite tendency: its ratio of oil reserves to oil production had a declining 
trend in 1986-2005 and hence its gross savings have been growing (see Fig. 9 in Appendix). 
If we compare change in the ratio of oil reserves to oil production and change in gross 
savings in 1980 and 2005, it will be equal to 34% decrease and 22% increase 
correspondingly. Norway had increase in the ratio of oil reserves to oil production from 21,6 
to 26 in 1986 due to discovery of new reserves and by 20% decrease in gross savings. In 
2003 gross savings declined sharply and ratio of oil reserves to oil production declined 
negligibly fluctuating around the level of 10 since 1996. Recently in 2004-06 gross savings 
increased again despite increase in oil prices as Norway follow quite conservative strategy of 
saving oil revenues.  
Looking at Nigeria it had positive interdependence between ratio of oil reserves to oil 
production and gross savings while Mexico had significant decline in the ratio of oil reserves 
to oil production and sufficiently stable gross savings (see See Fig. 9 in Appendix). The ratio 
has sharply declined for Mexico on 84% comparing the levels of 2006 and 1980 as oil 
reserves were hardly exploited and it takes time to develop new oilfields. For Nigeria it is the 
opposite –the ratio increased on 126% comparing the levels of 2006 and 198054. Nigerian 
gross savings fluctuated a lot and quite sharply: they reached their bottom several times - in 
1993-95 and were equal to 11% of GDP, in 1998 and were equal to 12% of GDP and in 
2002 again and were equal to 15% of GDP; since 2002 they have started to increase reaching 
34% of GDP in 2006. Mexican gross savings experienced negligible increase as a reaction to 
the oil price increase in 1973-74 and 1979 and 2003-04 and larger decrease in 1986. On the 
whole Mexican gross savings didn’t change radically fluctuating around 20% of GDP for 
last 36 years.  
Making a conclusion about relation between gross savings and real spending rate it can be 
pointed out that Saudi Arabia and Norway had negative relation while Nigeria had positive 
one and Mexican gross savings didn’t seem to be influenced by the real spending rate. Hence 
we see that each country has its own pattern influenced by country’s individual 
                                              
54 If we compare 2006 and 1970 the ratio of oil reserves to oil production increased only on 3,6% (see Fig. 10 in Appendix).  
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characteristics. Despite the common trend to spend oil revenues for Saudi Arabia, Nigeria 
and Mexico, the degree and the quality of that spending were different. Moreover Saudi 
Arabia started to make savings abroad much earlier than Nigeria and Mexico which is one of 
the reasons why Nigeria and Mexico are much poorer than Norway and Saudi Arabia 
nowadays. So following the safe strategy gave the same relation between gross savings and 
real spending rate for Norway and Saudi Arabia.  
4.2.2 Exchange regimes and national currency 
Another explanation for changing the spending pattern under the last oil price shock is that 
oil price increase coincided with a sharp fall in the dollar, reducing the external purchasing 
power of the currencies of those oil exporters that pegged to the dollar55. Among these four 
countries only Saudi Arabia has fixed exchange rate which has been pegged to the dollar 
since 1987 in order to avoid the Dutch Disease. Nigeria and Mexico have managed floating 
regimes and now only Norway has purely floating regime which was not always like that. 
Floating regime helps to mitigate appearing Dutch Disease by mitigating inflation and real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
If we look at Fig. 4.3 we will find that three countries except Saudi Arabia had real 
appreciation of the national currencies during the first two shocks in 1970s. In 1975-76 
Saudi Arabia experienced slight depreciation. Under the third considered shock in 1986 
appreciation of Saudis, Nigerian and Mexican currency changed by its depreciation; only 
Norwegian krone continued to appreciate. Since 2003 Norwegian currency became even 
stronger as whenever as well as Nigerian and Mexican currency.   
Figure 4.3. Real exchange rate, national currency against U.S. Dollar, 1970 – 2006 
 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
                                              
55 Setser (2007) 
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4.2.3 Inflation 
If we look at the inflation the country which was hit mostly was Mexico (Fig. 11 in 
Appendix). The level of inflation in Nigeria was also very high. Only Saudi Arabia had 
significantly lower level of inflation in comparison with Mexico and Nigeria. Moreover 
since 1978 it was basically lower than U.S. inflation. Saudis inflation experienced rises in 
1973-74 and 1979-80 as well as Mexican and Nigerian ones.  In 1984-87 Saudi Arabia had 
deflation with its strongest decline in 1986 which was equal to -3,2%. That was completely 
opposite to Mexican case in 1986. In 2003 inflation level was highest in Nigeria and equal to 
14% whereas in Mexico it was equal to 4,5% and in Saudi Arabia 0,6%. Most analysts think 
that the index of prices used to calculate the official inflation rate in Nigeria and Saudi 
Arabia is underweight services and overweight goods and consequently understates actual 
inflation56. Nigeria and Saudi Arabia have been subsidizing the fuel prices; besides, they are 
open to import of goods – in particular, import of food in Nigeria and import of labour in 
Saudi Arabia. So measure of inflation gives too small weight to services that is why inflation 
seems to be underestimated in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia.  
Norwegian inflation followed the pattern of other three countries having insignificant 
increase in 1973-74 and larger increase in 1979-80. In 1985-86 in contrast to Saudi Arabia 
and Nigeria which had decline, Norway had a small increase from 5,7% to 7% whereas 
Mexican level of inflation was enormous that time and inflation increased from 57,7% to 
86%. In 2003 Norwegian level of inflation was equal to 2,5%. 
4.2.4 Current account balance 
Another indicator of the country’s level which helps to understand if a country spends or 
saves money is current account balance. So looking at Fig. 4.4 we see that in 1978 all four 
countries had current deficit, the deepest one was for Nigeria. However when the oil price 
went up in 1980 only Mexican government was left with current account deficit; other 
countries had significantly improved their current account balances. But if we compare 
change in average current account before and after shock in 1977-78 and 1981-8257 (see Fig. 
                                              
56 Setser (2007) 
57 Data for Mexican current account balance is available just from 1979 so the comparison is made only for Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria and Norway. 
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4.5), we will see that increase in current account58 for Norway was more than 10% of GDP 
despite its huge deficit at the starting point partly due to oil investments which was exceed 
by current account surplus in 1981-82 due to intensive oil production. Meanwhile Saudis 
increase in current account was 6,5% of GDP and Nigeria had even decrease equal to 6% of 
GDP. Hence it means that Norway and Saudi Arabia were saving part of the money while 
Nigeria accelerated consumption of oil revenues. First of all Nigeria had salaries increase 
though productivity hadn’t been higher. Moreover new investments projects in education, 
industry and agriculture continued to be carried out especially in steel, irrigation and 
fertilizer production. Government tried to support capital-intensive industries and agriculture 
where two-thirds of the workforce were employed59.  But only inefficient allocations of 
investments were made aimed at large farms. Already in early 1980s Nigeria became 
dependent on food import as export of its agricultural products decreased significantly after 
appreciating Nigerian currency.  
Figure 4.4. Current account balance , % of GDP, 1971-2006 
 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
 
 
                                              
58 It is worth noting that many factors besides oil prices will affect current account. 
59 Auty (1990) 
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Figure 4.5.Change in average current account balance at the time of the oil price shock 
1979-80, % of GDP 
 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
If we look at the average current account change around the negative shock in 1986 (Fig. 
4.6) it becomes clear that Mexico and Norway increased their spending. Despite increase in 
oil revenues Nigeria continued its spending instead of saving. Saudi Arabia had significant 
decrease in oil revenues and finally it changed its strategy taking into account its permanent 
deficit and started saving– current account change was positive and was equal to over 4% of 
GDP.  
Figure 4.6 .Change in average current account balance at the time of  the oil price shock 
1986 ( % of GDP) 
 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
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The next oil price shock is recent increase in oil prices in 2003-2004 when oil price reached 
38$ per barrel60. This influenced positively growth of oil revenues in Saudi Arabia, Mexico 
and Norway: they increased on 19,3% of GDP, 1,7% of GDP and 4,63% of GDP 
correspondingly (see Fig. 8 in Appendix).  
As we see on Fig. 4.7 current account had positive change in Saudi Arabia, Mexico and 
Norway in contrast to 1970s. The highest one was in Saudi Arabia and was equal to 23% of 
GDP; change in Mexico and Norway was more modest – 2,05% of GDP and 1,6% of GDP 
correspondingly. Hence such countries as Saudi Arabia and Mexico started to save far more 
now than in comparison with 1970s and 1980s. Besides they stopped accelerating spending 
and treating the oil price increase as a permanent positive shock. 
Fig. 4.7. Change in average current account balance at the time of  the oil price shock 2003-
04 ( % of GDP) 
 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
Saudi Arabia having in mind its financial difficulties in the beginning of 1990s when its 
foreign assets ran down and its domestic debt ran up has been saving additional oil revenues 
keeping them in foreign assets. In particular Saudis government spent roughly 1/3 of the oil 
windfall and used 2/3 to repay debt and increase the kingdom’s deposits with the central 
bank61.  Besides government tries to provide current account surplus which has been 
                                              
60 In this section only Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Norway are discussed because data for Nigerian government finances is 
available only until 1987.  
61 Setser (2007) 
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successful since 1999 (Fig. 4.4) . This policy allows the government to defend itself from the 
volatility of oil revenues and to cover losses in case of oil revenue declines.  
Mexico also experienced recession in 1994-1995 and since then up to 2006 it had current 
account deficit (Fig. 4.4). In 1997-98 when it was the fall in oil prices the strategy of 
Mexican government was still to increase production in order to cope with the crisis but 
recently in 2007 David Robinson, Deputy Director of the Western Hemisphere Department, 
claimed62 that oil production will be decreasing over the next five years. He also highlighted 
the package of public sector reforms that were approved in September 2007 which he 
believes “will improve the effectiveness and accountability of public expenditure while also 
securing the tax resources to pay for essential government investments and social 
expenditures”. Besides current planning is based on a medium-term whereas in 1970s and 
1980s it was based on short-term. Furthermore they expect the decline in oil revenues over 
the next five years and don’t treat oil price shock as permanent. Another innovation is the tax 
reform that is created to substitute at least partly the loss from future oil production. 
Moreover the unified national account system will be introduced among states to improve 
transparency and accountability which was one of the problems under the Dutch Disease. By 
the way, Nigeria also launched recently the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative to improve its oil revenue transparency. 
Summarizing the pattern of current account and oil revenues change we can notice the same 
pattern as for government finances. In 1970s the reaction was similar, in 1980s countries had 
their individual patterns of responses and in 2000s changes in both indicators for Saudi 
Arabia, Mexico and Norway started to approach each other. However the size of these 
changes is quite different as Saudis oil reserves are incommensurably larger than Norwegian 
and Mexican. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The four considered countries represent the four different types of political regimes and 
different ways of using oil revenues. In 1970s the reaction to the shock was quite similar for 
                                              
62 Transcript of a Conference Call on Mexico's 2007 Article IV Consultation Washington, D.C. 
December 13, 2007 www.imf.org  
 58
Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico: oil revenues and government expenditures moved in the 
same direction. Oppositely Norway didn’t rely fully on unexpected oil revenues trying to 
diversify economy and to support non-traded sectors such as shipping, fishing, tourism etc. 
After negative shock in 1986 Saudi Arabia changed its strategy of subsidising and spending 
heavily on infrastructure, transportation and mining. It started to save money in foreign 
assets, whereas Nigeria and Mexico continued spending and were more and more dependent 
on oil. All four countries including Norway experienced current account deficits, 
appreciation of their national currencies and inflation. But the point is that oil revenues 
helped Norway and partly Saudi Arabia to overcome these economic difficulties but Nigeria 
and Mexico experienced continuous curse from oil revenues. However the reaction to the oil 
price shock in 2003 was quite different than to the previous ones: nowadays all the countries 
have egalitarian values and pursuing long-term or mid-term purposes including stabilisation 
of economy though Nigeria and Mexico are still struggling with poverty, current account 
deficit and inflation. Saudi Arabia discovered enormous oil reserves that help it to provide 
prosperous future. Norway represents the model of using the oil revenues and mature 
democracy for all these and other countries. However the problem that can arise for 
Norwegian government is increase in pension payments that will demand increase in 
spending of oil revenues whereas oil reserves and oil production are small now. So the next 
step is to solve a new challenge of the population aging that many countries will encounter in 
XXI century, and to repeat success of the past century.      
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5. Conclusion 
Despite the differences for such large oil countries-exporters as Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, 
Mexico and Norway in historical, economical and cultural background there could be 
distinguished some similarities in the reaction to the oil price shocks. The biggest common 
mistake for Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico was that the first and second oil price shocks 
in 1973-74 and 1979-80 were taken as permanent. These countries rushed to accelerate 
consumption, to invest heavily in domestic manufacturing, to decrease personal taxes and 
subsidize fuel prices. That resulted in real appreciation of the exchange rate, boosted 
inflation, current account deficits and outstripped domestic absorption.  
Another common feature of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico is weakened agricultural 
sector that actually supposed to be a buffer for the economies when oil revenues would 
decline. Nigeria, the African country that had bright prospects in 1970s, became dependent 
on food import already in the beginning of 1980s and still remains such one. The biggest 
problem for Nigeria and Mexico was that they donated money for large farms that were 
inefficient and didn’t support development of small individual farms. Besides they made 
more subsidies to urban population and to city infrastructure than to countryside. Moreover 
real appreciation of the national currencies made their export too expensive at the 
international market. So agricultural products produced in Nigeria and Mexico became 
incompatible and the countries came to be dependent on cheap products import that resulted 
in collapse of agricultural sector.    
Next common feature is poverty in 1970s which countries tried to overcome investing 
money in education and different supportive programs. Now there is lack of education for 
rural population and women especially in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia.  
The 1986 oil price shock led to decrease in government expenditures in Saudi Arabia and 
Mexico. However Nigeria kept spending its oil revenues. The beginning of 1990s was met 
by current account deficit in Saudi Arabia and Mexico and in the middle of the decade it was 
turn of Nigeria.  
In 2000s Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Mexico have been still dependent on the oil and trying to 
build economy that would be diversified. However the reaction to oil price is quite different 
than in 1970s and 1980s. Now countries are trying to save money and not to accelerate 
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spending. Besides they have tighter monetary policy and are trying to have sustainable 
growth combined with low inflation rate. 
Generally speaking Saudi Arabia did a little bit better than Nigeria and Mexico on account of 
three reasons. Firstly it accumulated financial resources abroad; secondly, as population of 
Saudi Arabia in comparison with population of Nigeria and Mexico is quite small, there was 
high influx of foreign workers that helped to absorb excessive money in the economy. And 
the third reason lies in the Saudis regime which was stable comparing to often changed 
government of Nigeria and Mexico. Hence there was no need to spend resources right away 
in order to get the support of electors. 
Norway had quite distinctive politics trying to save almost all oil revenues in order to have 
fair distribution of oil wealth and to build up diversified economy. Besides population had 
“high level of trust” to government that is why latter didn’t have to spend oil income 
immediately. Gradually economy became stronger, and saved oil money helped to sustain 
economy development even during the crisis in the beginning of 1990s.  
Nowadays oil reserves declined in Mexico and Norway whereas Saudi Arabia discovered 
enormous riches. Nigeria has also increase in oil reserves. These tendencies influence 
spending patterns as well forcing Norway and Mexico to save more now and Saudi Arabia to 
save less in comparison with 1970s.   
As we see there are some common and distinctive features of the behaviour of oil countries-
exporters. However each country has its own way to make or to continue making oil richness 
a “bless” in the XXI century.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Oil proved reserves, thousand millions barrels 
 
Year Mexico Norway Saudi Arabia Nigeria 
1980 47,2 3,6 168,0 16,7 
1981 57,0 3,9 167,9 16,5 
1982 57,0 3,8 165,5 16,8 
1983 57,1 3,8 168,8 16,6 
1984 56,4 4,9 171,7 16,7 
1985 55,6 5,6 171,5 16,6 
1986 54,9 6,1 169,7 16,1 
1987 54,1 6,6 169,6 16,0 
1988 53,0 7,3 255,0 16,0 
1989 52,0 7,6 260,1 16,0 
1990 51,3 8,3 260,3 17,1 
1991 50,9 8,8 260,9 20,0 
1992 51,2 9,7 261,2 21,0 
1993 50,8 9,5 261,4 21,0 
1994 49,8 9,6 261,4 21,0 
1995 48,8 10,8 261,5 20,8 
1996 48,5 11,6 261,4 20,8 
1997 47,8 12,0 261,5 20,8 
1998 21,6 11,6 261,5 22,5 
1999 21,5 10,9 262,8 29,0 
2000 20,2 11,3 262,8 29,0 
2001 18,8 11,6 262,7 31,5 
2002 17,2 10,4 262,8 34,3 
2003 16,0 10,1 262,7 35,3 
2004 14,8 9,7 264,3 35,9 
2005 13,7 9,6 264,2 36,2 
2006 12,9 8,5 264,3 36,2 
Source: www.bp.com  
Table 2. Oil production, thousand barrels daily 
 
Year Mexico Norway Saudi Arabia Nigeria 
1980 2129 528 10270 2059 
1981 2553 512 10256 1440 
1982 3001 532 6961 1290 
1983 2930 661 4951 1236 
1984 2942 752 4534 1388 
1985 2912 823 3601 1499 
1986 2758 907 5208 1467 
1987 2879 1054 4599 1353 
1988 2877 1196 5720 1496 
1989 2897 1567 5635 1775 
 65
1990 2977 1716 7105 1870 
1991 3126 1955 8820 1960 
1992 3120 2217 9098 2020 
1993 3132 2377 8962 2024 
1994 3142 2693 9084 1991 
1995 3065 2903 9145 1998 
1996 3277 3232 9299 2145 
1997 3410 3280 9482 2316 
1998 3499 3138 9502 2167 
1999 3343 3139 8853 2066 
2000 3450 3346 9491 2155 
2001 3560 3418 9209 2274 
2002 3585 3333 8928 2103 
2003 3789 3264 10164 2263 
2004 3824 3188 10638 2502 
2005 3760 2969 11114 2580 
2006 3683 2778 10859 2474 
Source: www.bp.com 
Table 3. Planned financial allocations for Saudi Arabia, 1970-1990 Five-Year Plans (%) 
Plan (1) 1970-75 (2) 1975-80 (3) 1980-85 (4) 1985-9063 
(5) 1987 
Revision
Development  
Economic Resources 6,5 18,5 32,8 13,1 5,0 
Human Resources 17,9 16,1 16,7 13,5 14,0 
Social 4,7 6,6 7,1 8,9 6,5 
Physical 
Infrastructure 29,2 22,7 33,3 14,4 2,5 
Total 58,3 63,9 89,9 49,9 28,0 
Other  
Administration 18,7 7,6 5,3 n/a 6,0 
Defence 23,1 15,7 n/a n/a 35,7 
Miscellaneous - 12,7 4,8 n/a 30,3 
Total 41,8 36,0 10,1 50,1 72,0 
Source: Auty (1990) 
Table 4. Production structure by sectors for Saudi Arabia (% of GDP), 1970-2006 
 1970-72 1973-74 1979-81 1986-87 1994-96 2003-06 
Agriculture 3,66 1,56 1,07 5,32 5,85 3,69 
Manufacturing 7,43 5,19 4,67 8,45 9,62 9,94 
Services 28,94 20,39 29,78 55,70 44,74 45,55 
Source: www.worldbank.org  
 
                                              
63 Total allocated: (1) US $9,2 billion, (2) US $141,7 billion, (3) US $222,0 billion, (4) US $227,0 billion.  
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Table 5. Production structure by sectors for Nigeria (% of GDP), 1973-1999 
 1973-74 1979-81 1986-87 1994-96 1998-99 
Agriculture 23,24 20,54 40,66 1,99 1,60 
Manufacturing 3,25 6,06 9,67 0,39 0,23 
Services 0,40 0,21 0,28 0,015 0,01 
Source: www.worldbank.org   
 
Table 6. Production structure by sectors for Mexico (% of GDP), 1970-2006 
 1970-72 1973-74 1979-81 1986-87 1994-96 2003-06 
Agriculture 12,29 12,09 9,27 9,99 5,97 3,88 
Manufacturing 23,07 22,84 22,30 25,58 20,34 17,96 
Services 56,16 56,11 57,31 53,56 66,36 69,93 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
Table 7. Production structure by sectors for Norway (% of GDP), 1970-2006 
 1970-72 1973-74 1979-81 1986-87 1994-96 2003-06 
Agriculture 5,64 5,12 4,18 3,74 2,91 1,58 
Manufacturing 20,77 21,37 16,19 14,17 12,72 9,95 
Services 63,08 63,15 57,37 62,04 62,48 57,05 
Source: www.worldbank.org   
Figure 1. Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)64 
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Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
 
 
                                              
64 The data is absent for 1987-88. 
 67
Figure 2. The importance of North Sea Oil and Gas, Fraction of GDP, Market Value, 1979-
2002 
 
 Source: www.ssb.no  
 
Figure 3. The Government Petroleum Fund 
 
Source: www.norges-bank.org 
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Figure 4. Diversification of the government’s wealth, 2006 
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Source: Norges Bank Investment Management 
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Figure 5. Change in government finances around  the oil shock in 1973-74 
 
  
Source: www.sama.gov.sa, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, www.ssb.no   
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Figure 6. Change in government finances around the oil shock in 1979-80 
 
 
Source: www.sama.gov.sa, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, www.ssb.no 
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Figure 7. Change in government finances around the oil shock in 1986 
  
  
Source: www.sama.gov.sa, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, www.ssb.no 
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Figure 8. Change in government finances around the oil shock in 2003-04 
 
 
Source: www.sama.gov.sa, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng, www.banxico.org.mx, www.ssb.no  
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Figure 9. Gross savings (% of GDP) and the ratio of oil reserves to oil production, 1970 - 2006 
 
Figure 10. Ratio of oil reserves to oil production for Nigeria, 1970 – 2006 
 
Source: www.opec.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75
 
Figure 11. Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), 1970 – 2006     
 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
